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RESPONSE TO REVIEW ARTICLES OF 
FLAME OF YAHWEH1
RichaRd M. davidson
Andrews University
I express my appreciation to David Instone-Brewer2 and Andre Claris Lombart3 
for their willingness to review Flame of  Yahweh, and for their perseverance in 
working their way through its 844 pages of  text. They have accurately grasped 
and articulated the overarching objective I was seeking to accomplish, and 
for the most part have fairly represented my views in their summaries of  the 
book’s contents. After my initial read of  their review articles, I was content 
to let the reviews stand, relieved to have received generally favorable marks 
from eminent scholars whom I respect. But upon further reflection, I could 
not resist the AUSS editors’ kind offer to allow me a brief  response to clarify 
various issues that were raised in these perceptive reviews.
I respond first to several points made by Instone-Brewer. Having written 
extensively on various issues dealt with in my book, Instone-Brewer is well 
qualified to pose questions in areas where he detects potential problems with 
my conclusions. I commend him for pinpointing many of  the thorny issues 
with which I have wrestled the most in my twenty-five years of  research 
and writing this book. I do not claim to have final answers to various knotty 
problems that appear in the biblical text. I have done my best to account for 
all the relevant data, have changed my mind more than once on several of  
these issues, and am willing to change my mind again as further evidence is 
forthcoming.
Regarding the issue of  monogamy/polygamy, it is true that I make what 
Instone-Brewer calls an “unusual claim”4 in arguing that the HB consistently 
upholds the ideal of  monogamy. The foundational biblical evidence is found 
in Lev 18:18. I have been persuaded by the penetrating studies of  Angelo 
Tosato5 and Gordon Hugenberger,6 augmented by my own research, that the 
Qumran interpretation is the correct one: this verse proscribes all polygamy, 
not just sororal polygyny (polygamy involving two consanguine sisters). I have 
1Richard M. Davidson, Flame of  Yahweh: A Theology of  Sexuality in the Old Testament 
(Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2007).
2David Instone-Brewer, “Review Article, I: Richard M. Davidson’s Flame of  
Yahweh: A Theology of  Sexuality in the Old Testament, AUSS 46 (2008): 245-250.
3Andre Claris Lombart, “Review Article, II: Richard M. Davidson’s Flame of  
Yahweh: A Theology of  Sexuality in the Old Testament, AUSS 46 (2008): 251-255.
4Instone-Brewer, 247.
5Angelo Tosato, “The Law of  Leviticus 18:18: A Reexamination,” CBQ 46 (1984): 
199-214.
6Gordon P. Hugenberger, Marriage as a Covenant: Biblical Law and Ethics as Developed 
from Malachi, VTSup 52 (Leiden: Brill, 1994; reprint, Grand Rapids: Baker, 1998), 202.
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found the many lines of  evidence—semantic, syntactical, literary, contextual, 
and theological—too formidable to interpret in another way, and I have not 
seen any studies that successfully challenge the conclusions based upon this 
evidence. I have found the other HB passages dealing with polygamy to be 
consistent with this foundational passage of  Lev 18:18, in condemning the 
practice, either explicitly or tacitly. Instone-Brewer contrasts my position 
with “most other scholars” who “argue that, in light of  ANE laws allowing 
polygamy . . . the HB disapproved of  polygamy while permitting it.”7 Actually, 
I agree with this position of  other scholars as stated by Instone-Brewer. I 
argue that the HB disapproves of  polygamy (in that it is presented as opposed 
to God’s ideal plan), but that polygamy is, at the same time, “permitted” (i.e., 
tolerated) in that there is no punishment set forth for this prohibited practice. 
The law of  Lev 18:18 is an example of  what Hugenberger calls lex imperfecta: “a 
law which prohibits something without thereby rendering it invalid (reflecting 
a society which would have lacked the requisite means of  enforcement in any 
case).”8 Many other practices in Scripture are morally condemned by God, but 
not illegal from a civil standpoint (see, e.g., the tenth commandment, which 
morally prohibits coveting but provides no civil punishment for breaking this 
command). 
With regard to the death penalty for adultery, Instone-Brewer suggests 
that “Davidson allows his theology to somewhat overpower his conclusions 
from the text.”9 Such may appear to be the case, but in actuality I was driven 
to my conclusion by the text. At least on this point, it was definitely not my 
theology that overpowered my conclusions because in all drafts of  my book 
manuscript until the last year or so I adhered to the view presented by Moshe 
Greenberg and others that the death penalty for adultery was absolute and 
noncommutable. (In fact, I unwittingly allowed this language to remain on 
at least one page of  the first printing of  Flame,10 and it was removed in the 
second printing.)  It was only very late in my research process that I came upon 
the evidence presented by Joe M. Sprinkle, Bruce Wells, Hilary B. Lipka, and 
others, that strongly suggests the possibility of  commuting the death sentence 
under certain (unspecified) circumstances.11 There may be another way of  
7Instone-Brewer, 247.
8Hugenberger, 118, cited in Flame, 197.
9Instone-Brewer, 247.
10Flame, 175.
11Ibid., 373-375, 391-392; see Joe M. Sprinkle, “The Interpretation of  Exodus 
21:22-25 (Lex Talionis) and Abortion,” WTJ 55 (1993): 237-243; and idem, “Sexuality, 
Sexual Ethics,” Dictionary of  the OT: Pentateuch, ed. T. Desmond Alexander and David 
W. Baker (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2003), 744; following Bruce Wells, “Adultery, 
Its Punishment, and the Nature of  OT Law” (paper presented at the annual meeting 
of  the Evangelical Theological Society, Orlando, Florida, 20 November 1998). See 
also Hilary Lipka, “‘Such a Thing Is Not Done in Israel’: The Construction of  Sexual 
Transgression in the Hebrew Bible” (Ph.D. dissertation, Brandeis University, 2004), 
220-223.
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encompassing these two apparently contradictory strands of  evidence (found 
together in close proximity, for example, in the book of  Deuteronomy), but I 
have adopted the conclusion that seemed to best account for all of  the relevant 
evidence. On one hand, adultery is indeed an absolute crime against God and 
the regular prescribed punishment is the death penalty, with no gradation of  
punishment based upon social standing or varying intentions as elsewhere 
in the ANE. Yet on the other hand, there apparently could be some kind of  
extenuating circumstances in which this death penalty was commuted. 
The possibility of  commuting the sentence of  adultery seems implied 
in passages such as Hos 1–3 and Prov 6:35. I also find it implied (although I 
may have argued it “weakly,” according to Instone-Brewer12) by the fact that 
laws concerning several other high-level crimes such as murder and idolatry 
explicitly prohibit clemency (see Deut 7:16; 13:8; 19:13, 21; and 25:12), but 
such prohibitions never occur with regard to adultery. Inasmuch as I dealt with 
this possibility of  leniency only in the concluding and more practical “Divine 
Grace” section of  the chapter on adultery, I did not develop my argument as 
much as I might have. But the full discussions of  the evidence by Sprinkle et 
al., as referenced in a footnote,13 to me were persuasive. In addition to the OT 
evidence, I find further affirmation for this position in Jesus’ own example 
in commuting the death sentence for adultery under certain circumstances 
(John 8:1-12).
With regard to the issue of  divorce, I recognize and rejoice that Instone-
Brewer has written a whole book on this topic,14 from which I derived much 
benefit, especially with regard to ANE parallels. I am gratified to see that 
Instone-Brewer finds persuasive my arguments that the unusual hotpaal form 
of  “defile” in Deut 24:3 should be translated “she has been caused to defile 
herself.”15 I am still convinced (but have apparently not [yet!] fully convinced 
Instone-Brewer) that since the phrase “defile oneself ” elsewhere in Scripture 
implies the equivalent of  adultery, therefore according to Deut 25 the husband 
who divorced his wife has in effect caused her to commit adultery when she is 
forced (by need for financial security) to remarry. I argue that Jesus’ statement 
in Matt 5:32 seems to point to his awareness of  this implication of  the hotpaal 
form when he states: “whoever divorces his wife for any reason except sexual 
immorality causes her to commit adultery.” 
Instone-Brewer finds contradictory my conclusion that (in his words) 
“the fault for which she [the woman in Deut 24] was divorced appears to be 
sexual, but it must have fallen short of  adultery else she would be executed 
(even though he [Davidson] said at the end of  chap. 8 that death could 
be commuted).”16 Here again, I seek to account for all the data involved, 
12Instone-Brewer, 248.
13Flame, 373, n. 132.
14David Instone-Brewer, Divorce and Remarriage in the Bible: The Social and Literary 
Context (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002).
15Instone-Brewer, “Review Article,” 248.
16Ibid. 
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assuming a consistency in the Mosaic legislation. I argue that it is important to 
make a distinction between what is stated de juro and what may have happened 
de facto. According to Mosaic law, adultery was to be punished by death and 
hence legally (de juro) would not be regarded as one of  the assumed grounds 
for divorce in the case law of  Deut 24. Yet, inasmuch as there might be some 
unusual mitigating circumstances in which the death penalty for adultery 
might be commuted, the possibility cannot be ruled out that in practice (de 
facto) the fault of  the woman being divorced may have included adultery. This 
section of  my book was originally written when I still assumed that there was 
no commuting of  the death penalty for adultery, and after broadening my 
understanding to include the possibility of  such commutation under unusual 
circumstances, I sought to integrate the two sets of  data in a meaningful way. 
Perhaps there is a better way to bring such integration, and I am open to such 
an alternative that is faithful to all the evidence.
Instone-Brewer also finds contradictory that (again in his words) “he 
[Davidson] finds no HB grounds for divorce, and yet concludes that . . . 
divorcees could remarry.”17 Here again (as with the issue of  polygamy) I 
maintain that it is crucial to distinguish in the HB between what is legal and 
what is moral. With regard to Deut 24, I argue for the existence of  an implied 
ultimate divine moral disapproval of  all divorce, even as divorce is legally 
“permitted” to take place. Though not illegal, divorce is not morally pleasing 
to God. Divorce, and hence remarriage, was not forbidden or punishable in 
the HB, but while it is permitted in Moses’ legislation there is nonetheless a 
hint in that very legislation that calls back to the Edenic ideal of  permanence 
in marriage. This hint becomes explicit in Mal 2:16 where God states: “I hate 
divorce!” Thus I can argue (without any contradiction, at least as far as I can 
see) that while divorce was never God’s will morally, yet legally (as Instone-
Brewer states it in his summary of  my view) “women as well as men were able 
to divorce in ancient Israel.”18
Instone-Brewer correctly points out the absence of  pertinent Jewish 
and Greco-Roman background in the Afterword dealing with the NT. This 
was a deliberate omission due to the immense amount of  material involved 
and (especially) because the Afterword was specifically focused at showing 
implications of  the OT materials for the NT views of  sexuality. I freely 
acknowledge that a theology of  sexuality in the NT still remains to be written. 
Perhaps Instone-Brewer, with his specialty in NT, is willing to tackle this 
task!  
Turning now to the issues raised by Lombart, I first commend him for 
providing the reader with a succinct summary of  the basic points in a theology 
of  sexuality as I see it emerging from the OT. Lombart has insightfully 
discerned that the “issue of  gender is at the heart of  the book.”19 While his 
suggestion has merit that the word “gender” might even have been added 
to the subtitle, I believe that my broader definition of  “sexuality” to include 
17Ibid., 250.
18Ibid., 248.
19Lombart, 254.
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gender issues as well as other concerns is defensible and appropriate, even if  
not in line with distinctions made by some social scientists.20 
Lombart has correctly recognized my “egalitarian interpretation of  the 
Genesis account,” but he has provided an incomplete and thus potentially 
misleading statement of  my position on Gen 3 when he writes: “He [Davidson] 
maintains that this principle of  ‘husband servant leadership’ is necessary in a 
sinful world to preserve harmony in the home.”21 What I argue is that God 
instituted a “husband servant leadership” in the Garden after the Fall (Gen 
3:16) as a temporary stopgap measure where it might be necessary in a sinful 
world to preserve harmony in the home. But I go beyond this to suggest that 
God’s ideal in a sinful world continues to be egalitarian marriage (as presented 
in Gen 1–2), and the biblical materials consistently reveal God’s attempt to 
call couples back toward this ideal whenever possible. It is for this reason 
that I do not present more examples or practical illustrations of  “servant 
leadership” in biblical families, as wished for by Lombart.22 
When I illustrate the principle of  “servant leadership” by suggesting, for 
example, that the husband be the first to say, “I’m sorry,” Lombart finds it 
tempting to see here the implication that “the husband is to be subservient 
and subordinate to his wife, thereby contradicting the ‘egalitarian’ postulations 
by the author.”23 However, I do not find a contradiction here, but rather, the 
principle of  “mutual submission” as expressed in the NT (e.g., Eph 5:21).
Lombart rightly warns against misuse of  narrative theology, and suggests 
that I may have stepped over the line in implying the sexual consummation 
by Adam and Eve on their wedding night. He wonders if  consistency should 
demand that there be a parallel between the time of  betrothal outside of  Eden 
and a similar time of  “longing, waiting, and appreciating” after the couple’s 
creation before sexual consummation.24 The suggestion is an interesting one, 
but in my estimation consistency points more strongly in another direction: 
outside of  Eden the regular practice was that the sexual consummation took 
place on the wedding night and, according to Mosaic legislation, this was 
even expected and necessary (see Deut 22:13-21). The sexual union was 
the indispensable means for the consummation of  the marriage, and may 
well have been regarded as the covenant “oath-sign” of  the marriage.25 The 
consistent parallel in Eden would then be consummation of  the marriage on 
the wedding night. 
Despite Lombart’s proper caution about the potential for misuse in 
narrative theology, I remain persuaded that the narrative clues in Gen 3 point 
to the conclusion that Adam and Eve consummated their marriage union that 
first Friday evening of  creation week. There was indeed a time of  “longing, 
20See Flame, 2.
21Lombart, 254.
22Ibid.
23Ibid.
24Ibid.
25Flame, 382, n. 26, following the suggestion of  Hugenberger, 279.
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waiting, and appreciating,” but in the unique case of  the first couple, it came 
already before Eve was created; as Adam named all the animals, he saw that they 
all had partners and experienced the “hunger for wholeness” that God then 
supplied by creating Eve. God created Eve perfectly matched to be Adam’s 
equal partner (Gen 2:18, 20), and both Adam and Eve were uniquely created 
as fully formed adults, ready for marriage. 
If  God had intended that there be an extended period of  betrothal-like 
experience for Adam and Eve before their marriage, this could have been 
accomplished by delaying the wedding. But Gen 2 portrays God officiating 
at the couple’s wedding immediately after introducing Eve to Adam. Adam’s 
first recorded statement after God brought Eve to him contains unmistakable 
covenant-making terminology, constituting what we would call the wedding 
vows (v. 23). After the depiction of  the first wedding service, the narrator 
immediately adds that this wedding is a model for all future weddings: the 
“one flesh” sexual consummation is to follow after the “joining” of  the 
marriage covenant (v. 24-25). Song of  Songs also presents this pattern, as 
the sexual consummation of  the marriage follows immediately upon the 
heels of  the wedding service (Song 4:16; 5:1). Just as the first account of  the 
creation week in Gen 1 is climaxed by the holy Sabbath (Gen 2:1-3), so the 
complementary account in Gen 2:4-25 is climaxed by the holy institution of  
marriage, with its implied sexual consummation of  that marriage in the “one 
flesh” experience of  Adam and Eve (2:22-25). The sexual intimacy and union 
on the horizontal level between Adam and Eve within the sacred space of  
the Eden sanctuary (2:15-25) is the counterpart of  the spiritual intimacy and 
union on the vertical level between God and humans within the sacred time 
of  the Sabbath (2:1-3). 
Lombart succinctly and accurately summarizes the ten facets of  a 
theology of  sexuality that I set forth in chap. 1, but then asks why I selected 
these ten and not others. The answer is that these facets are the ones that 
emerged from my exegetical study of  Gen 1–2. An earlier study of  these 
passages uncovered seven facets,26 but further study expanded these to ten. 
I may later find additional facets, but these are the ones that have inductively 
emerged from my exegetical research thus far.
Regarding the “pastoral” and  “moralistic” tones that surface in the book 
on occasion, to this charge I must plead guilty! I tried to rein in my pastoral-
moralistic tendencies, and my editor applied the scalpel to the manuscript 
more than once. Yet some traces definitely remain. It is my contention that 
in biblical theology, contrary to Semler, Gabler, Stendahl and others who 
separate between what the text meant and what it means, what it “meant” 
is what it still “means” (see the work of  my mentor, Gerhard Hasel, Old 
Testament Theology: Basic Issues in the Current Debate), and thus it is appropriate 
in an OT biblical theology to draw practical applications for today. I did try 
to keep these to a minimum, however, and put them in footnotes wherever 
possible. I also justified (rightly or not) inclusion of  certain practical insights 
26Richard M. Davidson, “The Theology of  Sexuality in the Beginning: Genesis 
1–2,” AUSS 26 (1988): 5-24.
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such as the “twelve steps to moral integrity” in the hymnic Wisdom literature27 
by noting that the overall thrust of  the Wisdom literature was a practical-
moralistic one, and hence I was being faithful to the spirit of  the biblical genre 
I was interpreting!   
Lombart is correct that the section on the Song of  Songs could have 
been shorter, or could have been a separate book on its own. I seriously 
considered publishing the Song of  Songs material as a separate monograph, 
especially partway through my long journey of  researching this material when 
I despaired of  ever completing the entire project! But in retrospect, I am 
glad I did not excise any of  this material or publish it separately. After all, the 
Song of  Songs represents Scripture’s major statement on sexuality—a whole 
book given over to celebrating the beauty and joy of  married sexual love! 
Should it not be given as much space as needed to develop the rich theological 
material contained therein? Furthermore, the Song of  Songs implies that it 
is an interpretation of  the Garden of  Eden experience, a “Return to Eden.” 
Only by placing the material on Gen 1–3 in the same context as the material 
from the Song of  Songs could such interpretation and development be 
demonstrated. I have tried to balance these two parts of  the book by setting 
them apart as the matching opening and concluding sections, entitling them 
“In the Garden” and “Return to Eden” respectively, and by assigning them 
each two chapters. 
Once again, I thank David Instone-Brewer and Andre Claris Lombart 
for their incisive book reviews. I freely acknowledge that there is much yet to 
learn (and unlearn!) about sexuality in the OT, and look forward to ongoing 
dialogue with these and other scholars as we continue to explore this vital 
subject together. 
 
27Flame, 375, n. 138.
